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ENDCIDE

The fallowing essay is based on a talk
delivered at the UN during the American
Bar Association~ Conference
Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the
Genocide Convention, March 12-13, 1998.
The panel on which Professor Alvarez
participated, charged with examining the
legacy and future of the Genocide
Convention, also included john E Murphy,
professor at Villanova University Law
School, Ambassadors William]. vanden
Heuvel and Robert E Van Lierop, and Nobel
Laureate Elie Wiesel.
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Second, they hoped to give fair
warning - so that future perpetrators
could not claim, as revisionist critics of
Nuremberg maintained, that the
international community was imposing
"ex post facto" criminal liability.
Third, drafters hoped that by
legalizing the duty to prevent and to
punish genocidal acts they were helping
to ensure that such acts would "never
again" occur. They were hoping to
promote the many lofty goals pursued at
Nuremberg: namely, to deter future
perpetrators; to tell the truth of what
occurred, thereby preserving an accurate
collective memory; to vindicate victims
and their families; to channel the thirst
for revenge into the more peaceful
channels of a courtroom; to make
atonement possible for perpetrators; to
affirm that national and international
"rule of law;" and to help restore the lost
civility of torn societies and thereby
achieve "national reconciliation."
Fifty years and numerous mass
atrocities later, we must acknowledge
that they failed. The Convention has
failed to stigmatize as "genocide" many
mass atrocities of our time that target
people based on political beliefs or other
characteristics. While acts by the Khmer
Rouge directed at Vietnamese, Chinese
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THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

and Thai minorities, or against religious
groups, such as the Buddhist
monkshood, appear to be acts
encompassed by the Convention,
atrocities against the general Cambodian
population are more difficult to
encompass if victims were targeted solely
as members of political, professional, or
economic groups. Similar difficulties
arise with respect to the treatment of
Kurds by Iraqis, Mengistu's actions in
Ethiopia before 1991, or the treatment of
political opponents throughout Latin
America.
In addition, the Convention's
requirement that specific intent "to
destroy" a group "as such" needs to be
shown has led to intractable arguments
over the characterization of other
massacres. There are even some who
suggest that Balkan "ethnic cleansing,"
if intended "merely" to displace
populations for the sake of acquisition of
territory, is not cognizable as "genocide."
Indeed, some affirm that there were only
three real "genocides" in this bloody
century: the slaughter of the Armenians
by the Young Turks in 1915, that of the
Jews and Gypsies by the Nazis, and that
of the Tutsis by the Hutu in 1994.

Although I am sensitive to the need to
avoid verbal inflation for this most
infamous of crimes, I think that we
should avoid making this crime an
irrelevancy. I agree with Ambassador Van
Lierop that it is time to revisit the all too
narrow political compromises contained
in the Genocide Convention. As was
done in the wake of WWII, we need to
look around today and respond to the
realities of what we see. As in 1948, we
need to ground genocide in reality and
stigmatize as the gravest of crimes acts of
violence that target human beings
because of inherent characteristics that
they share with others. While
Ambassador Van Lierop addressed the
need to address groups targeted because
of their politics, I want to address a
different issue.
There is abundant evidence that
gender-specific violence has long been a
common tool of genocide. If it is true, as
many reports suggest, that rape, enforced
prostitution, enforced sterilization,
enforced impregnation, enforced
maternity, and sexual mutilation are used
to specifically target women as women
then I think we have a case for amending
the Genocide Convention at the
international level or for expanding the
definition of "genocide" at the national
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level through domestic laws in order to
recognize that the crime includes, in
addition to those categories mentioned in
Article II, victimization because of
gender.
The evidence that we have suggests
that "ethnic cleansing" in the former
Yugoslavia sought to eliminate unwanted
groups through odious but diverse
methods to humiliate, shame, degrade
and terrify, causing groups to disappear
from areas. It appears that there, as
elsewhere, rape has been used as a tool
of expulsion: to humiliate or emotionally
destroy victims and their family
members; to provoke chaos and terrified
flight; and to render victims submissive
and subordinate. Perpetrators, aware of
the impact of rape in traditional societies
(including Muslim cultures), seem to
have consciously deployed rape to
degrade not just the individual woman
but also to strip the humanity from the
larger group(s) of which she was a part.
There is abundant evidence that both in
Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia,
being a woman was a significant risk
factor; being female was all too often the
predominant reason for assault or a
significant factor in being singled out,
even for death. In Rwanda and Bosnia
and elsewhere, sexual assaults have been

used as a specific tool in pursuit of
ethnic liquidation but also as a weapon
that specially targeted women,
particularly professional women such as
judges, for special treatment. It is alleged
that rape was such a formalized part of
the policy of the Yugoslav conflict that
soldiers were threatened with castration
or death for refusing to rape.
Sexual assaults reportedly have been
used in all the ways anticipated by
Article II of the Genocide Convention.
Sometimes such acts have been used to
cause the death of the victim; sometimes
to prevent births within the group by
causing physical damage to the woman's
body; sometimes to inflict mental injury
on a female so that she might refuse to
engage in future consensual relations or
be refused by her husband. Most
diabolical of all are the allegations that
systematic rapes, sometimes in specially
created brothels for the purpose, have
been used to impregnate non-Serb
victims to produce "ethnically pure"
Serbian babies, with women detained as
hostages until they were past the point of
abortion. This last, rape for reproduction
as ethnic liquidation, seems most
squarely within even existing definitions
of genocide.

Of course, genocidal rape, including
the abuse of womens reproductive
capacities, was not unheard of even in
1948. International criminal law has
been slow to recognize the needs of
women and has repeatedly failed to bring
actions against persons guilty of those
sex-specific crimes that have been, for a
long time, accepted as violations of the
laws and customs of war (including
forced prostitution in Asia during
WWII) Insofar as gender and genocide
are concerned, women have been caught
in a "Catch-22." As one of my colleagues
has put it: "What is done to women is
either too specific to women to be seen
as human or too generic to human
beings to be seen as specific to women."
Indeed, after reviewing all relevant
international legal instruments, including
the Genocide Convention, Kelly Dawn
Askin concluded in her book, War
Crimes Against Women (1997), that
"museums, paintings, buildings, and
armed combatants have been provided
with far more protections over the years
than have female civilians." Although the
existing international tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
appear ready to acknowledge genderspecific violence as crimes against
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humanity and as war crimes, they have
yet to call such acts "genocidal" even
when such crimes are deliberately
inflicted upon a group in an effort to
cause that groups destruction, wholly or
partially, physically or emotionally.
While it is of course possible to
prosecute individuals for sex-specific
violence under national law as domestic
offenses or as violations of the laws of
war, the same is true for all other acts
that are now included as genocide.
Gender needs to be expressly included in
our definition of genocide for the same
reason nationality, religion, ethnicity, and
race now are: because when we ignore
groups that are targeted because of their
inherent collective status, we fail to tell
the full truth of the barbarism that
occurred. When we call what happened
in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda
merely an "ethnic war," and refuse to
acknowledge the special victimization of
women as women, we fail to preserve a
part of collective memory, we fail to
vindicate the interests of a particular
group of victims, we fail to warn
perpetrators that sexual assault is no
longer part of the fruits of war, and, of
course, we may fail to fully enforce the
rule of law.
The reasons for recognizing the
gender of genocide are both practical and
philosophical. Genocide is the most
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infamous of crimes. Prosecutors are less
likely to drop a charge of genocide, as
they now do a charge of "mere" rape, on
the basis that it is "too difficult" to
prosecute or that it is merely
"duplicative" of other offenses charged in
an indictment. A charge of genocide
rectifies the impression, created by its
perpetrators, that its victims are "less
than human," "deserve what they get," or
have been somehow "complicit" in their
victimization. Nowhere is the need to
correct these falsehoods more acute than
with respect to victims of gender-specific
violence. Moreover, wdmen deserve to be
protected under the Genocide
Convention for the same reason other
victims do: because genocide is the most
widely accepted of international crimes,
applies to both situations of armed
conflict or peace, international wars or
internal conflicts, and, unlike crimes
against humanity, is subject to a
specialized convention that gives the
crime a precision that many other
international crimes lack. The Genocide
Convention correctly identifies the
interest all humanity has in protecting
the interests of distinct nationalities,
races, creeds and ethnicities. Symbolically,
it is important that the law recognize the
interests of one half of humanity that
happens to be female . While there are, of
course, considerable issues that would
need to be worked out if the Genocide
Convention were expanded as proposed

here, including whether certain "cultural"
practices, such as female infanticide,
would therefore qualify as genocide, it is
important that such issues be put
(finally) on the international agenda for
discussion.
A second problem with the Genocide
Convention is more obvious and has
been noted by others here today. The
Conventions biggest flaw was its failure
to give any substance to the ostensible
duty on states to "prevent" genocide. The
Convention failed to put in place any
mechanism by which the international
community, or significant elements of it,
could be compelled to act to prevent the
preventable or even to provide early
warning of potential cases. Instead, the
parties to the Genocide Convention
merely undertake to "call upon"
competent organs of the UN.
But a third critical flaw is all our own
and cannot be blamed on the drafters of
1948. Today, the international
community, especially international
lawyers, appear to be so enamored of the
international that we risk ignoring the
virtues of the local. At present, we are
devoting far greater attention and
resources to the two ad hoc international
tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia (not to mention negotiations
to establish a permanent international
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criminal court) than we are to aiding
local Ethiopian or Rwandan war crimes
prosecutions or to assisting governments
elsewhere that are struggling with the
aftermath of mass atrocities. While the
international community is right to be
concerned about the fairness of local
processes to deal with war crimes, we
have not devoted anywhere near as
much attention to correcting the possible
problems with local attempts to render
justice as we have to attempts to perfect
international justice.
And what have we achieved through
our internationalist priorities?
Five years after establishing the first
international war crimes tribunal since
Nuremberg and four years after
establishing the second, the international
community has managed to conclude
one full trial for a war crimes suspect to sentence one low level functionary to
effectively 10 years in jail after a trial that
lasted nearly a year and cost approximately
$20 million. Four years after one of the
largest genocides of the modem era, in
Rwanda, we have yet to convict at the
international level anyone of genocide for
that massacre. While I agree that
establishment of these tribunals has
tremendous symbolic importance and
has increased awareness of international
humanitarian law, we should not pretend
that we have fulfilled the goals of the
Genocide Convention merely by
establishing these bodies. The struggle

against genocide continues to require
engagement on a multitude of levels,
domestic and international, along with a
multitude of fora, civil and criminal.
Like Ambassador Van Lierop, I
entertain considerable doubts about the
wisdom of our priorities with respect to
Rwanda. I fear that the operations of the
Rwandan international tribunal, created
by the Security Council, may not be fully
consistent with the goals of the Genocide
Convention. I fear that we may be
turning our hopes for international
criminal trials into a nearly religious
crusade, thereby losing sight of the
manifold, sometimes conflicting, goals
that we need to simultaneously advance.
The present Rwandan government has
reluctantly acceded to an international
tribunal that, contrary to local Rwandan
sentiments, enjoys "primacy" with
respect to jurisdiction over perpetrators
(whether or not it is shown that such an
individual can receive a fair trial within
Rwanda), is incapable of imposing the
death penalty, is restricted to crimes
committed only in 1994 and not before,
is far removed from the territory in
which the crimes occurred, is unfamiliar
to the victims of the genocide, and does
not include a Tutsi or a Hutu on its
bench. Under the present scheme, it
appears that some of those guilty of
killing the greatest number of people will

face a leisurely international trial with the
full panoply of rights followed by a
relatively short detention in a prison that
is up to international standards, while
many of those guilty of lesser offenses
will face imperfect and expedited
Rwandan justice followed by the death
penalty. Such "anomalies of inversion"
(see Madeline H. Morris, "The Trials of
Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case for
Rwanda," 7 Duke Journal of Comparative
and International Law 349 [1997]) will do
precious little to affirm the international
or the national rule of law in the eyes of
the Rwandan people. For Rwandans
there is considerable hypocrisy in being
told not to impose the death penalty on
genocidal murderers by countries such as
the United States - a nation that
continues to impose the death penalty
for far less serious offenses and that is
loathe to relinquish national jurisdiction
with respect to mere serious offenders,
including those accused of
masterminding the Lockerbie bombing.
Moreover, the international tribunal for
Rwanda will do precious little to relieve
the plight of the one percent of Rwandas
population now languishing in its jails
and nothing to prevent the continuing
acts by Hutu militants and reprisals by
the Tutsi military. In the wake of such
realities, it seems absurd for international
lawyers to pat themselves on the back for
their "success" in establishing this
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"worthy heir to Nuremberg." We need to
ask ourselves whose priorities are most
furthered by the international tribunal in
Arusha: the international communitys or
the Rwandan people's?
With respect to mechanisms for
punishment, the Genocide Convention
wisely stressed the role of national
courts. It only mentioned the possibility
of an "international penal tribunal" with
respect to states that "accept ... its
jurisdiction." Although this was probably
a concession to real politick at the time ,
there are in fact substantial reasons to
prefer that war crimes prosecutions be
conducted by· national courts,
particularly but not solely in the region
where they occurred, and, yes, even
involving individuals who were among.
those "complicit." However difficult it
may be to make sure that such trials are
conducted fairly, with full respect for the
rights of defendants and victims, at least
some of those proceedings are more
likely to enjoy the legitimacy of the
people we most hope to affect and only
such proceedings are likely to help
restore the rule of law where it matters
most - at the local level where all of us,
including international elites, live.
Further, it is not as if we have created
perfect international courts in place of
flawed national ones. Although we
international lawyers like to point out the
problems with local proceedings, we are
disinclined to be totally frank about the
flaws of the international processes we
have put in place in their stead. Despite
our best efforts, we have not managed to
correct the flaws of Nuremberg and
Tokyo: the accusations of victors justice,
novel criminal liability, and defective
collective memory: While the
international war crimes tribunals at The
Hague and in Arusha were not put in
place by victors after a war, they remain
subject to a politicized body with
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questionable representative credentials:
the Security Council - a UN organ that
threatens to apply international
humanitarian law selectively and
certainly not to the actions of permanent
members of the Security Council itself.
There are doubts that these tribunals are
enforcing "universal values evenhandedly
applied" and suspicions that international
prosecutions are driven by, and are
certainly not above, international politics.
Nor have we managed to eradicate
charges of that we have been unfair to
litigants through the imposition of
"novel" criminal liability. Although
international humanitarian law has
developed much in the 50 years since
Nuremberg, most of those developments
have occurred on paper but not in
practice. The gaps in international
criminal law, including with respect to
the meaning of the crime of genocide, are
legion and large. We do not really know,
at least not until an international judge at
The Hague or in Arusha tells us, what
needs to be demonstrated to prove the
requisite "subjective intent" for genocide;
much less what "complicity," "attempt" or
"conspiracy" in genocide means. We have
no idea if the "hate speech" of Rwandan
radio broadcasters will be encompassed
or whether a prosecutor will be forced to
show a direct link between words uttered
on Rwandan radio and particular
killings. We, and more significantly
potential defendants, do not know
whether the international tribunals now
in place will convict systematic rapists of
"genocide" or whether pro.;ecutors and
judges will take the view that the
tribunals' respective statutes would have
to be modified to bring this about. As all
of these issues suggest, much of the
scope of international criminal law
remains for future caselaw development
- a prospect that is likely to lead to
accusations that international judges are
"legislating" new rules from the bench.
At least some of the problems and many
of the gaps in existing law could be more

easily filled by national courts able to
draw on established 'national criminal
law.
Finally, there is the issue of
preservation of collective memory: Most
agree that the history of the Holocaust is
still being written, and that the
proceedings at Nuremberg, which made
the waging of aggressive war the linchpin
of all charges, were historically flawed as
they left unrecorded the plight of the
Jews and Gypsies, not to mention
women , homosexuals, and others. The
major Nuremberg trials were conducted
as if the Holocaust was incidental to the
waging of war. If today we have achieved
a fuller sense of the dimensions of the
Holocaust and its implications, we owe
this more to people like my fellow
panelist Elie Wiesel than to Nurembergs
Robert Jackson. Developing an accurate
historical record that is just to the full
dimensions of mass atrocity is not the
forte of specialists in international law or of international judges who are not
from the afflicted regions, who operated
far from where these horrors occurred,
and who are usually totally unprepared
to deal with a criminal trial.
It may be that perpetrator-driven
courtroom narratives are an inherently
weak and defective tool with which to
preserve history. Even so, we may need
to acknowledge that national proceedings
enjoy better prospects in this respect.
Accurate history requires listening to the
stories of many victims. It requires many
trials, not just a selective few, and it
requires trials for low level functionaries
- that can show us how barbarism was
routinized - as well as for the "big fish ."
Most of all it requires extensive public
deliberation in many fora - including
literature and the arts as well as the law.
The didactic functions of war crimes
trials may best be furthered at the local

level, through hundreds of trials that
truly resonate within a local culture and
whose lessons do not appear to be
imposed, in top-down fashion, by the
"international community."
We must assume that those who
drafted the Genocide Convention were
intent on defining and giving effect to a
real crime. To this end, they recognized
that governments needed to "enact ...
necessary legislation" - that is, to take
action within their internal legal systems.
As we know, achieving this has not been
easy. Still, 50 years later, an increasing
number of countries are recognizing that
genocide is a universal crime over which
they have jurisdiction, even if it did not
occur on their territory or involve their
nationals as victims or perpetrators. In
some cases, some brave courts, including
federal courts in Manhattan, are
accepting jurisdiction over civil suits
against genocidal culprits. Alien tort
claims involving alleged perpetrators
from both Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia are now creating civil
components to Nuremberg. Whether or
not monetary damages (or injunctions)
arising from such suits are ever enforced,
these proceedings are permitting victims
to tell their stories through processes that
they, not international prosecutors with
distinct agendas, control, and through
such suits, victims are securing public
acknowledgment of what they suffered.
In addition, such suits are at least as
symbolically important as many of the
activities of the ad hoc international war
crimes tribunals. Certainly they
unequivocally put the U.S. judiciary on
the side of saying to people like the
Serbian leader Karadzic that they are not
welcome to come to the United States.
In addition, interestingly enough, at least
the Karadzic suit seems more likely to
recognize the gender of genocide than
are trials at The Hague.

Let me not be misunderstood.
International tribunals, including the
proposed permanent international
criminal court, remain part of a many
sided approach to dealing with genocide.
The Genocide Convention anticipates
and we need to continue a multipronged effort that includes such trials as
well as suits in the World Court, civil
suits and criminal proceedings in
national bodies, diplomatic negotiations
(as at Dayton), and other unilateral and
multilateral action to mobilize shame and
penalize guilty governments and state
actors. But we should not give up on the
opportunity (and the challenge) of
effective preventive measures or local
remedies. And we should not use the
establishment of international courts as
an excuse not to do more about these.

In the end we may come around to
appreciating, once again, that prevention
is the best cure and that in national
courts may lie the best hopes for
securing many of the goals of the
Genocide Convention when we
regrettably fail to prevent genocide. It
may be that we will only rid the world of
genocide when it is treated as a crime
under laws everywhere and when it is
prosecuted by the most effective means
any of us are likely to see in our lifetimes
- by local police, by local prosecutors,
and by local courts. Only if millions of
national courts are serious about
punishing genocide wherever it occurs,
only if they tum the agents of genocide
into real pariahs, will we be able to say
"never again" and this time achieve it.
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